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The Inspect Repair Only As Necessary (IROAN) program is a depot level 
maintenance program designed to improve the operational availability of Light Armored 
Vehicles in the Marine Corps inventory.  The policy for assigning vehicles to the IROAN 
program is based on age, mileage and operating hours, with the primary criteria being 
time since last IROAN cycle.  A cost benefit analysis was conducted using historical 
readiness reporting to determine if the current policy is the most cost effective among 
reasonable alternatives.  Research indicates that the LAV fleet is actually managed on an 
eight year cycle, with vehicles from the operating forces receiving depot maintenance 
more frequently.  Indications are that the average time between depot maintenance for 
operating force vehicles is only slightly more frequent than the optimal timing of seven 
years. In the course of this research it became clear that the fragmented nature of USMC 
vehicle maintenance data makes performing these types of studies time-consuming and 
expensive.  Consequently the difficulties in obtaining relevant data limit the quality of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION  
The past five years have seen the Marine Corps committed to operations around 
the world at a rate not seen for four decades.  The leadership of the Marine Corps 
recognizes the demands that this has placed both on the service members and their 
equipment.  The Marine Corps planned on its equipment being used at a certain rate with 
a maintenance and recapitalization plan built around those assumptions.  Because the 
Marine Corps has exceeded those planned operational employment rates for the past 5 
years,  there have been challenges in maintaining the readiness of the equipment, and 
those challenges are likely to continue. 
The Marine Corps is not alone in this situation.  The Army, which has an even 
greater amount of equipment, is grappling with how to maintain the readiness of their 
equipment, whether it is bulking up maintenance processes or speeding up 
recapitalization.  They have commissioned several studies to help them focus on which 
efforts are likely to generate the greatest benefit to the combat power of the Army (Peltz, 
2005).  One of these studies conducted by Rand Corporation delved deeply into the 
factors affecting the operational availability of M1 tanks.  One of the major research 
questions was how to use statistical models of operational availability relationships to 
inform decisions about recapitalization (Peltz, 2005. xiv). 
This study seeks to quantify the relationship between operational availability and 
the depot overhaul program the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs). With a 
similar goal to the Rand study, the purpose is to provide the LAV Program Manager (PM 
LAV) a useful measure of the economic benefit of the current program. The PM may 
then make more appropriate decisions on the allocation of resources to ensure the highest 
possible level of support for the operating forces. 
There is s suspicion within the LAV community that the IROAN program has not 
been cost effective. The impetus for this project came from then Program Manager LAV, 
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Colonel John Bryant, USMC (personal communication, April 2006).  Unit costs for the 
IROAN program have soared over the past decade, and combined with the pressures 
created by increased operational tempo and reduced safety stock at the Depot, it became 
necessary to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the program (Mullins, Adams, 
Sims, 2005).   LAV Depot Maintenance is currently being reconsidered.  The alternative 
to the current IROAN is Specified Overhaul and Return (SOAR), and it includes a 
significantly reduced Statement of Work, with the goal of reducing repair cycle time to 
60 days and average unit cost to $200,000 (CWO3 Persely, personal communication, 
October 2006).  This research project is independent of the restructuring of LAV Depot 
Maintenance, but is clearly relevant to the matters under consideration. 
The IROAN process has been previously researched by Naval Postgraduate 
School students.  In 2005, Michael Mullins, Troy Adams and Robert Simms analyzed the 
Depot’s effectiveness in implementing Theory of Constraints into their processes.  
Ronald Wilson conducted a Cost Benefit Analysis of reducing the number of LAV depot 
maintenance sites form two to one in December of 2000.  Both of these studies provide 
valuable insight into the Marine Corps’ maintenance system.  But they both focused on 
how to make the depot maintenance process more efficient or effective, vice attempting 
to measure the contribution of IROAN to vehicle readiness. 
In general the approach that will be used in this project report will mirror Edith 
Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser’s framework for analysis (Stokey & Zeckhauser, 5).  
Their approach was developed for the policy decision maker in the public sector and 
includes the following steps: 1) Establish the context, 2) Lay out the alternatives, 3) 
Predict the consequences, 4) Value the outcomes and 5) Make a decision.  Since the goal 
of MBA Project is to provide better information to the Program Manager about the 
effectiveness of a program, the project will only pursue steps one through three and apply 






A. FAMILY OF LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES 
1. Program Origins 
The U.S. Army and the Marine Corps identified a need for a light armored 
platform in the 1970’s.  Officially designated the Mobile Protected Weapons System, the 
acquisition program did not progress very far until 1979.  The Iranian Hostage crisis 
highlighted to the Defense community the need for a rapidly deployable force with 
sufficient mobility and firepower to accomplish missions once it was deployed.  Airborne 
forces were too light for the threat, and armored forces were too heavy to deploy quickly.  
Under these circumstances, Marine Major General Al Gray successfully was instrumental 
in convincing the administration and Congress to fund an off the shelf buy of 
approximately 700 light armored vehicles.  The program was approved in 1980, and the 
first unit officially stood up in 1986 as the LAV Battalion.  The name of the units 
changed several times as the Marine Corps developed employment doctrine, finally 
settling on Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in the early 1990’s.1 
 
2. Description of Variants 
Eight different variants of the Family of Light Armored Vehicles (FOLAV) have 
been purchased by the Marine Corps, seven of them still in service.  The bulk of the 700 
vehicles are LAV-25 variants.  These vehicles have a hydraulically powered turret that is 
armed with a 25mm Bushmaster chain gun, a 7.62mm coaxially mounted machine gun, 
and a commander’s 7.62mm machine gun.  The crew consists of a commander, gunner, 
driver, and a three man scout team.  A Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion currently 
has 60 of these vehicles, with four of them in the HQ, and the remaining 56 evenly split 
                                                 
1 Michael Peznola, “Marine Light Armor 1980-1999 Operational Goals Tactical Results: A Study in 
the Dynamics of Change”, Research Paper for the School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps 
University, Quantico, Va.1999.  Major Peznola’s research paper is the best available source on the 
establishment of Light Armor in the Marine Corps. 
 4
among four LAR companies with 14 each.  The companies normally have three platoons 
of four vehicles, and two LAV-25s in the HQ section.  This vehicle carries out the bulk of 
the unit’s missions.  With their mix of firepower and manpower, they have proven very 
capable in accomplishing missions throughout the spectrum of conflict.  Total inventory 




Figure 1. LAV-25 
 
The LAV Anti-Tank (LAV-AT) is armed with an Emerson 901 turret capable of 
firing four TOW missiles before reloading.  The turret was originally developed and 
utilized by the U.S. Army for use on the M113 APC chassis.  The turret carries two Tube 
launched, Optically tracked, Wire guided (TOW) anti-tank missiles ready to fire.  There 
are four LAV-ATs in each LAR Company, organized into a section led by a Staff 
Sergeant.  They are typically employed in support of LAR platoons.  They have a crew of 













Figure 2. LAV Anti-Tank 
 
The LAV Mortar (LAV-M) is armed with an 81mm mortar mounted on a 
turntable.  It can be fired from the vehicle, but it must be stationary and the hatches over 
the rear of the vehicle must be opened.  There are two LAV-Ms per LAR Company and 
they are normally used to provide marks for Close Air Support, provide illumination and 
provide immediate suppression to support disengagement.  The LAV-M has a crew of 6; 
driver, commander, gunner, assistant gunner, and two ammo men.  There are 50 of these 
vehicles in the Marine Corps inventory 
 
Figure 3. LAV Mortar 
 
The LAV Logistics variant (LAV-L) is a cargo variant.  It is used by logistics and 
maintenance personnel to move supplies around the battlefield, and can be outfitted with 
a kit to transform it into an armored ambulance.  There are three per LAR Company, with 
one typically employed as an ambulance, one for transporting supplies and ammunition  
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and the third for carrying tools and parts.  Its crew of two is comprised of a driver and 
commander, and there are 16 in a battalion (four LAV-Ls in headquarters).  The Marine 
Corps has 94 LAV-L vehicles.   
 
 
Figure 4.   LAV Logistics 
 
The LAV Command and Control Variant (LAV C2) provides robust 
communication capabilities.  The vehicles provide four VHF, one HF, one UHF, and one 
SATCOM channel.  Each LAR Company has one of these vehicles, and the battalion 
headquarters has four.  The crew comprises a commander and driver, with seating 
stations for five personnel in the back.  There are 50 LAV-C2s in inventory for the 
Marine Corps.  
 
 
Figure 5.  LAV Command & Control 
 
The LAV Recovery variant (LAV-R) is essentially a wrecker for the LAV.  It has 
a 10,000 lb. extendable boom, a 60,000 lb. winch, an acetylene torch and an arc welder.  
The LAV-R has a crew of four; comprising driver, commander, boom operator, and 
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welder. There is one LAV-R per LAR Company, and the battalion HQ has two in its 
maintenance platoon.  There are 45 units of this variant in the Marine Corps inventory.2 
 
 
Figure 6.  LAV Recovery 
 
The seventh variant still in the Marine Corps inventory is the Marine Electronic 
Warfare Support System (MEWSS).  There are less than 15 of these vehicles in the 
inventory.  They reside in the MEF’s Radio Battalion as a signal intelligence and 
electronic warfare platform.  The MEWSS vehicle has a crew of four; driver, 
commander, and two system operators.  These vehicles are a part of the IROAN program, 
but due to their small numbers and their separation from the LAR Battalions in mission 
and sophistication of their equipment, they are managed by a different organization even 
though the system uses the same vehicle platform. 
All variants have seen a great deal of use while in service with the Marine Corps.  
Different demands are placed on the various models due to the manner in which they are 
employed.  The LAV-25, as stated before, is the backbone of the unit and is involved in 
almost every mission.  When conducting reconnaissance operations, they frequently 
travel over rough terrain right up to the limits of the vehicles’ capabilities.  While 
conducting security operations the vehicles are usually stationary, but will still have to 
                                                 
2 There are multiple open sources on the internet that are available for information on LAVs.  The 
HQMC factfile website at http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/factfile.nsf is a good source as well as 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/index.html. Both of these sources were accessed in 
October 2006. 
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run their engines approximately 1/8th of the time to maintain enough charge in the 
batteries to operate the turret systems and start the vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 7.  MEWSS 
 
The LAV C2 has very different demands placed upon it.  Due to the large 
electrical demand of the communications system, this vehicle spends a lot of time idling 
to maintain charge on its batteries.  Because it is a key part of the Command cell, and 
there is only one per company, it is used a lot during operations and in training.  These 
vehicles usually have a lot of recorded operating hours. 
The LAV-AT also has some peculiar characteristics. The turret system is 
notoriously unreliable, and because there are so few units in service within DOD, parts 
are very difficult to obtain.  The complexity and fragility of the system forced some 
amphibious units not to take their LAV-ATs on deployment, either going without or 
substituting LAV-25s.  This situation might skew the data pertaining to these vehicles. 
3.  Distribution and Historical Employment 
The Marine Corps has three active duty Light Armored Reconnaissance 
Battalions, and one reserve battalion.  First LAR Battalion is based out of Camp 
Pendleton, CA and belongs to the First Marine Division. First LAR has four LAR 
Companies and a Headquarters and Support Company.  First LAR Bn supports the 11, 
13, and 15 Marine Expeditionary Units with platoon to company sized detachments.  
Second LAR Battalion is based in Camp Lejeune, NC under the command of the Second 
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Marine Division.  Second LAR Bn also has four LAR companies and an H&S Company 
and they support 22, 24, and 26 MEU.  Third LAR Battalion is based in 29 Palms, CA 
and belongs to the 1st Marine Division.  Third LAR Bn has four LAR Companies, but 
only three companies’ worth of vehicles.  The fourth company of vehicles is in Okinawa 
as part of the Third Marine Divisions’ Combined Assault Battalion.  Third LAR Bn has 
one company on deployment to man the vehicles in Okinawa.   
LAR Company
25 vehicles

















LAR Company Table of Equipment for Light Armored Vehicles
 
Figure 8:  LAR Company from MCRP 5-12 
  
The reserve battalion is 4th LAR Battalion and they are a part of the 4th Marine 
Division (Reserves).  Company A is located in Camp Pendleton, CA.  Company B is in 
Fort Detrick, MD.  Company C is in Toele, UT.  Company D is in Quantico, VA. 
Additionally, the Marine Corps has pre-positioned reserve equipment in the Maritime 
Pre-positioned Squadrons (MPS) and placed a number of LAVs in training organizations.  
These vehicles represent what is called “out of stores”.  The “in stores” population 
consists of the Depot Maintenance Float Allowance (DMFA) and War Reserve Material 
Requirement (WRMR).  
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4.  Maintenance Concept 
Light Armored Vehicles are maintained using a three level system.  
Organizational maintenance capability in Light Armored Reconnaissance units is robust, 
meaning that organizational maintenance is equipped, manned, and trained to perform a 
large percentage of the total maintenance tasks. This capability comes at a cost of 
extensive tool sets, and approximately 80 LAV mechanics in each battalion.   
The intermediate maintenance capability resides in the Force Service Support 
Group’s Ordnance Maintenance Company (OMC).  There is one OMC per Marine 
Expeditionary Force. This unit primarily conducts repairs on certain components of 
armored vehicles within the MEF.  These items are referred to as “secondary repairables” 
or “secreps.”   
The third level of maintenance is the depot. There are two maintenance depots for 
the USMC LAVs; one in Albany, Georgia and the other Barstow, California.  These two 
maintenance centers conduct major hull repairs and perform the IROAN process.  The 
depots are resourced through working capital funds.   This means that the depots are 
supported by a revolving fund which is replenished as that they are paid for the work that 
they perform by the operating forces “pay” for work using Operations and Maintenance 
funds.  Since depot rates reflect full cost recovery, labor, materials, and overhead are all 
present in the Direct Labor Hour (DLH) rate that they charge for the year.  The operating 
forces send vehicles to the depot based upon how much O&M they received for the given 
Fiscal Year.  Typically, sophisticated models are used for programming and budgeting 
for depot maintenance, and the workload generally is close to the agreed upon amount 
between the operating forces and the maintenance centers.   
B.  IROAN PROCESS 
1.  Vehicle Process 
After programming and budgeting are completed and the number of vehicles to go 
to depot has been determined, a Master Work Schedule is built to maintain a steady flow 
of vehicles in and out of the depot.  Once a particular vehicle has a start window, the 
owning organization begins preparing the vehicle for shipment.  This usually takes two 
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weeks, and entails the removal of certain equipment and multiple inspections.  Equipment 
that is removed is referred to as SL-3 items, and it includes radios, tools and fire 
extinguishers.  These items will be reinstalled on replacement vehicles that have gone 
through overhaul.  The inspections are meant to streamline work at the depot, in that 
depot mechanics have a listing of known defects on a vehicle when it arrives.   
Once the inspection and item removal tasks are completed, the vehicle is shipped 
to the depot and upon its arrival is received by the Fleet Support Division (FSD).  FSD 
maintains the Depot Maintenance Float Allowance and stores the inbound LAVs 
awaiting IROAN.  Normally vehicles will be held two to four weeks in FSD before and 
after completing IROAN. 
During the IROAN process the vehicle is stripped of all components until only the 
hull remains.  The hull is inspected for corrosion and fractures.  Following the hull 
inspection, the vehicle is repainted, and components are replacing broken with good ones 
as necessary. Once completely reassembled, the vehicle is inspected and tested by the 
depot personnel. Deficiencies are corrected by the depot and the vehicle is transferred 
back to the Fleet Support Division. FSD preserves, packages, stores and then prepares the 
vehicle for shipment back to a using unit. “Analysis of Light Armored Vehicle 
Maintenance”, an MBA Professional Report by Michael Mullins, Troy Adams and 
Robert Simms is available for a more detailed description and analysis of the IROAN 
Process. 
Once the operating forces receive the overhauled vehicle, they must remount the 
SL-3 components and conduct receiving inspections.   Again this usually takes a couple 
of weeks.  Frequently bugs need to be worked out in the vehicle and small repairs made. 
Overall the end-to-end repair process takes about 150 days.  The Maintenance 
Centers have reduced their cycle time to 120 days (Mullins, 40), but this does not account 
for the organization’s preparation time on both ends of the process, or for transportation 
to and from the depot.  Normal shipping times are around 7 days; organizational 
preparation is about one week on either end.  These activities add another month to the 
process, bringing the total to about 150 days.  Normally there is a queue at the FSD 
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before the process and after the process, further increasing repair cycle time.  However, 
current Operational Tempo and vehicle casualties have eliminated that queue.  150 days 
is currently a fair assessment of the true repair cycle time for the IROAN program.  The 
Mullins, Adams and Simms Report (2005) goes into greater detail into the actual process 
at the Maintenance Centers. 
C.  PROGRAM MANAGER 
 The Program Manager for the Light Armored Vehicles (PM LAV) is based in 
Warren, Michigan.  A Marine Colonel holds the billet and is responsible for the life cycle 
management of the LAV fleet for the Marine Corps and to support the fleet of LAVs with 
the Saudi Arabian National Guard.  PM LAV’s organizational chart is useful to outline 
the myriad of tasks they are charged with accomplishing. 
Business Management and Contracts divisions provide support to the project 
divisions by providing expertise in particular acquisition areas.  LAV Upgrades/ 
International manages the three upgrade programs referenced in Figure 9, and supports 
the Saudi Arabian National Guard’s fleet of LAVs.  The LAV A2 program office 
manages the acquisition of the additional 120 LAVs that the Marine Corps needs to equip 
five new LAR Companies, as well as the upgrade program to get the legacy fleet to the 
same level of capability as the new vehicles(Persely, personal communication October 
2006) . 
Sustainment/Readiness is focused on the readiness of the vehicles in the operating 
forces.  They support the fleet by maintaining contracts for parts, incorporating fleet 
recommended modifications, monitoring the performance of parts to identify components 
that could be replaced to improve readiness and managing the LAV IROAN program.   
Specifically, the PM holds the funding for the IROAN program, and determines what will 
be done in the process, and how many vehicles will go in a given year.  This means that 
the PM has to fight for the funding in the PPBES process 
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Figure 9:  PM LAV organizational structure from Colonel Bryant's Advanced 
Planning Brief to Industry April 2006 
  . 
Overall, the PM has a mission to support the fleet of LAVs that the Marine Corps 
owns.  The PM collects information through both formal and informal channels.  
Formally, there are two annual conferences within the LAV community that the Program 
Management Office will attend.  The PM sponsors a maintenance conference to solicit 
input from the fleet which parts or processes are an issue, and this event is normally 
attended by battalion maintenance officers and maintenance chiefs as well as executive 
officers.  The Light Armored Reconnaissance Operational Advisory Group meets 
annually and includes LAR Bn commanders.  The primary mission of this group is to 
prioritize acquisition programs for the community, and justify their necessity.  The results 
provide input into the Marine Corps’ programming and budgeting processes.  The PM is 
a non-voting member of this group, but he is central to providing much needed 
acquisition and programming information to the group.  These meetings also provide an 































III.  METHODOLOGY 
A.  APPROACH 
In simple terms, this project seeks to quantify the readiness benefits of the 
IROAN program and compare these benefits to the costs.  The traditional approach 
attempts to forecast future revenue streams or cost savings expected from alternate 
decisions and compare them to expected costs.  In this case the historic costs of the 
IROAN process are well documented.  Forecasting cost changes due to changes in 
demand, i.e., adjustments in the number of vehicles that are sent to IROAN, is not at 
issue.   
Deriving the benefits the Marine Corps receives for their investment in the 
IROAN process is the focus of this report.  The traditional approach seeks to identify and 
quantify the amount of cost savings the Marine Corps is receiving from the program.  The 
simplest way to do this would be to track what were the organizational and intermediate 
maintenance costs for a given set of vehicles with a known IROAN date.  Analysis of this 
data over sufficient time and given a large enough sample size would likely prove 
adequate to substantiate the value of the IROAN program.  Unfortunately, the Marine 
Corps supply and accounting systems are designed to meet the demands of the budgetary 
process.  Thus they are designed to collect aggregate costs for units over the fiscal year. 
The Naval Center for Cost Analysis collects data from the Navy and Marine Corps and 
stores it in an online database named VAMOSC (Visibility and Management of 
Operations and Support Costs).  This is a very useful and accessible database, but its 
utility is limited in this study by the fact that it does not track individual vehicle serial 
numbers in any way, and serial number is the only method available to determine when a 
vehicle has gone through the IROAN program. 
Similarly, an analyst could measure the benefit received from the program in 
terms of increased operational readiness.  The Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance 
Management System and the Marine Automated Readiness Evaluation System (MARES) 
are designed to report what vehicles are broken and the readiness of equipment.  A useful 
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analytical endeavor would be to track the readiness of a sample of vehicles from one 
IROAN cycle to the next IROAN cycle.  Again, because the focus of reporting systems is 
on readiness of the fleet of vehicles, rather than individual vehicles, the historical data on 
a particular vehicle is not accurate enough to be useful.  Appendix A is a narrative of the 
life of a vehicle over a span of time and illustrates the difficulties of this approach. 
B.  DATA SOURCES & TECHNIQUE 
Major Chris Frey USMC, and Mr. Bill Vinyard developed and have used a model 
to forecast the readiness of LAR units by the age of their vehicles.  The goal of their 
model was to help them forecast the appropriate demand for IROAN to maintain a certain 
minimum level of readiness.  In the model, vehicles are sorted into two pools; those that 
have been to IROAN within the past five years, and those that have not.   
Frey and Vinyard fed normally reported data into their model.  That is, the 
readiness of LAVs is reported weekly in an LM2 report from the Marine Automated 
Readiness Evaluation System (MARES).  Readiness is reported by Marine Expeditionary 
Force.  There are six different reporting units in this system for LAVs, I,II & III MEF, 
Marine Forces Reserve (4), Bases Posts and Stations(6), and Prepositioned Equipment(8).  
Based on weekly readiness reports over a six year period, Frey and Vinyard were able to 
generate the average readiness for the two IROAN categories, sorted by MEF.   
C.  LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The resources available for any study are finite, and this one is no different.  Time 
and labor considerations forced this study to use the data available.  In this case, 
readiness reports from 1997 to 2003 were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
IROAN program.  Although this data stops short of the major combat operations that 
have occurred since, it has the benefit of not being clouded by the turbulence generated 
from the frantic operational tempo over the past three years.  Major combat operations 
have significantly altered the way the fleet has been managed out of necessity.  Destroyed 
vehicles and frequent rotations of units have forced old patterns out of the way, and it is 
not clear what new cycle or pattern will work.  In other words, the variability of the 
system over the past three years makes it difficult to assume many variables to be 
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constant.  The fact remains that the research data used is from a finite period that is not 
representative of the conditions placed upon the LAV fleet currently. 
A second limitation concerns the number of variants studied.  As this study 
highlighted in Chapter II, the variants are employed in different ways.  However this 
study is focused on the 400 or so LAV-25s.  There are two reasons for this limitation in 
scope.  The first is that LAV-25’s form the bulk of the population and are the principal 
weapon system of the units that have them.  The second reason is that a large amount of 
data was reasonably available, making a more detailed examination of data possible.  In 
other words, more time spent searching for data would have left less time analyzing the 
data for meaning.  A more thorough examination including all of the variants is possible, 
given greater resources in terms of labor and/or time. 
It is necessary to explicitly state the assumptions made to conduct this study.  The 
Statement of Work (SOW) for the IROAN program has been reviewed and altered.  It is a 
contract between the PM and the Depot over what work will be performed.  Some 
method of normalization would be a preferred method for accounting for the changes in 
the SOW.  This would require some kind of baseline understanding of the effectiveness 
of IROAN in one year.  All other years could then be normalized from the base year.  
However since this is the first documented study of the effectiveness of IROAN, that 
baseline does not currently exist.  For the purposes of this study, we must assume that an 
IROAN cycle in 1995 is equal in effectiveness to one in 2002, or all IROANs are equal. 
D.  ALTERNATIVES TO BE EVALUATED 
The stated current policy is to plan to send a vehicle to IROAN when it reaches 
one of three criteria; 6 years since last overhaul, 25,000 miles, or 2,000 operating hours.  
In reality, practice differs from policy and the default criterion is time since last IROAN. 
The PM wants measure of return the Marine Corps is receiving through its investment in 
IROAN. There are several potential methods to provide a meaningful answer to the PM’s 
question.  This research effort will analyze the comparative readiness effects of inputting 
LAVs into IROAN according to various time intervals. This project will compare the 
costs versus the readiness benefits associated with rotating vehicles into IROAN at 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. OVERALL FLEET 
For the purposes of this paper, “fleet” will refer to the 407 LAV-25s in the Marine 
Corps inventory. “In Stores” means that a vehicle is either in the DMFA or the WRMR.  
“Out of Stores” refers to the number of vehicles that reside in one of the six Unit 
Identification Codes. Figure 10 represents total authorized inventory of 753 LAVs by 
variant.  














Numbers represent authorized quantities
 
Figure 10.  FOLAV variant population 
 
 
Figure 11 displays the distribution of the “Out of Stores” LAV-25 population by 
reporting unit, or UIC.  This is a current picture of where LAV-25s are located.  The data 
was accessed from the Marine Corps Equipment Readiness Information Tool (MERIT) in 
October 2006.  It identifies the deployed vehicles, and highlights that the currently 
deployed vehicles were assigned to I MEF. 
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Figure 11.  LAV-25 Out of Stores Distribution as of October 2006. 
 
1.  Statistics and Regression 
 Overall, the LAV-25s are being managed on an eight year cycle.  The Frey model 
sorted the population into two baskets, IROAN within the past five years or not.  The 
model was modified to use four, five, six, seven and eight years as the sorting condition.  
The model also sorted the data by MEF.  This study altered the model to aggregate the 
reporting from all units.  Given the total number of LAV-25s that have been through 
IROAN in the past 8 years and 7 years, we can find the population that has been through 
depot maintenance between 7 and 8 years. Repeating this process for 6-7 years, 5-6 years, 
and 4-5 years gives an average distribution of the “age” of the fleet with respect to 
IROAN.  Table 1 and Figure 12 display the breakout, and show that despite the stated 




Rating Average Qty 
< 4yrs 91.11% 186.35
4-5 Yrs 88.99% 50.96
5-6 yrs 88.30% 49.83
6-7 yrs 89.68% 50.41
7-8 yrs 89.68% 48.79
Table 1.  Fleet Readiness and Distribution  by IROAN Age 
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Figure 12.  Distribution of LAV 25s by age since last Overhaul 
Figure 13 is a graphical representation of the readiness column in Table 1.  This 
curve casts doubt on our hypothesis that Readiness should decrease as IROAN Age 
increases.  The steady drop in readiness suddenly begins to improve past the six year 
point. 
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Yrs since last overhaul
R-Rating
  
Figure 13.  Overall Fleet Readiness against IROAN Age 
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The author’s experience with the vehicles combined with conversations with the 
Maintenance Officer from the Program Manager’s Office led to some further 
assumptions.  We believe that fleet management and employment conspire to mask the 
effect of IROAN on reported readiness. 
2.  Four Conditions Masking Effectiveness 
Four factors possibly serve to hide the effectiveness of the IROAN program.  
They are recognized by operators and maintainers within the community, but have not 
received systematic study. 
One of these conditions could be termed the “Prepo Effect”.  On average, 13% of 
the LAV-25 fleet is on Maritime Prepositioned Squadrons.  These vehicles are used only 
in training exercises and real world operations, which can generally be characterized as 
infrequent.  Ownership of these vehicles shifts to the operating unit that signs for them, 
and subsequent readiness reporting will appear on their LM2 report, vice the LM2 report 
for prepositioned equipment. 
Additionally, MPS squadrons are on a very lengthy rotation for their equipment to 
go through refit.  Consequently, LAVs that are aboard MPS shipping are not routed 
through IROAN as frequently as operating force vehicles. 
Likewise, the training pool in 29 Palms, California is a special case. The Exercise 
Equipment Allowance Pool (EEAP) has approximately one company’s worth of vehicles 
on hand for a unit to fly in, draw these vehicles, conduct training, turn in the vehicles and 
fly home.  These vehicles are used heavily, but because of the dry climate which severely 
limits corrosion and the intense maintenance scrutiny these vehicles receive, this 
population has not received a vehicle from IROAN in over 10 years (Persely phoncon of 
4 October).  Predictably, this skews the data by understating the effect of IROAN. 
The third factor is what is called the “Hangar Queen”.  Operators recognize that 
some vehicles are more reliable than others regardless of crew maintenance efforts.  
Because of the flexibility in assigning which vehicle goes to IROAN, this “Hangar 
Queen” is likely to go to IROAN sooner than a normal vehicle. 
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The fourth consideration is vehicles within the Marine Forces Reserves.  The 
Fourth LAR Battalion faces different challenges than the operating forces.  This unit has 
less access to the supply system because of the distance involved.  Reserve forces do not 
use their vehicles continually unless they are activated. And if they are activated, they 
would normally report their readiness under the reporting code of the MEF that they were 
assigned.  The result is that the conditions underlying MFR readiness are significantly 
different from the active forces, and although time since last overhaul may be as 
significant for MFR as it is for the active forces, their overall readiness drivers are likely 
to be significantly different making the analysis less clear. 
Three of these conditions can be factored out of the analysis, but the third one 
cannot.  The “Prepo effect” and the “EEAP effect” and Reserve forces can be factored 
out of the analysis by removing their vehicles from the analyzed sample.  The “Hangar 
Queen” effect cannot be factored out of the analysis, which means that subsequent 
calculations represent the lower bound for the effectiveness of IROAN.  In other words, 
we will know that IROAN contributes at least this much to the operational readiness of 
the vehicle. 
B. OPERATING FORCES 
Readiness reports from the active forces LM2 reports was analyzed in a similar 
manner to the overall fleet.  The results were statistically significant. After removing non-
operating forces from the data, the weekly population was sorted into two pools; DLM 
and non-DLM.  The time since last IROAN, or “IROAN Age”, is the discriminator for 
determining which pool the vehicle falls into for that weeks LM2 report.  This sorting 
process was done for IROAN ages 1-8 years.  The population for the 7-8 year group is 
calculated by subtracting the DLM population for year 7 from the DLM population for 
year 8.  This process is repeated to generate the average weekly population in each 
IROAN age group.  Figure 14 graphs the results.  The standard deviation is included to 
give the reader a visual picture of the increasing variability. 
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Table 2.  Table of Average Readiness of Operating Forces LAV-25s with 
Regression 
 
There are several interesting characteristics of this data.  First the regression is a 
pretty good fit to actual data.  The actual adjusted coefficient of determination (Adj. 2R  ) 
IROAN 
Age (Yrs) R-Rating +1σ -1σ Regression 
1 96.04% 101.26% 90.82% 95.31% 
2 92.77% 98.26% 87.28% 93.34% 
3 90.98% 96.98% 84.97% 91.37% 
4 86.91% 95.11% 78.72% 89.40% 
5 89.09% 97.13% 81.06% 87.44% 
6 86.50% 95.53% 77.47% 85.47% 
7 86.63% 97.25% 76.02% 83.50% 
8 78.42% 104.32% 52.51% 81.53% 
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was 0.815.  This means that age accounts for 81.5% of the variation of readiness by year 
from overall average readiness of Operating Forces LAV-25s. 
Although this data is not perfect, it does represent a useful quantitative look at the 
effect of IROAN on the readiness of LAV-25s in the Operating Forces.  We can use this 
data to conduct Step 3 of the Stokey & Zeckhauser framework; Predict Outcomes.  
However, some assumptions are necessary to predict these outcomes.  One assumption is 
that the policy will be perfectly followed.  For example, this means that if the prescribed 
policy is a 4 year cycle, then exactly one fourth of the vehicles will be in each age group.  
A second major assumption is that all other factors affecting readiness are held constant.  
An explanation is required before discussion of the next assumption. We have the 
historical readiness of LAV-25s in a given IROAN age group.  Given a particular policy, 
we simply divide the number of LAV-25s in the operating forces by age policy in years.  
The quotient is the number of vehicles in each year group.  Multiplying year group 
populations by historical average readiness yields the expected number of vehicles that 
are operationally available for that year group.  The sum across all year groups for that 
particular policy choice is the expected number of LAV-25s operationally available to the 
operating forces in theory.  
The Depot Maintenance Float Allowance shields the operating forces from fully 
feeling the burden of the IROAN program.  Because of the deleterious effects of current 
operations on this account, this research project has chosen to disregard the DMFA to get 
a clear picture of the cost of the IROAN program. So, in our calculation, we will subtract 
the cost of IROAN in equivalent vehicle terms from our expected operationally available 
LAV-25s. The calculation of cost is straightforward. The Table of Organization 
authorizes 180 LAV-25s for the Operating Forces. Divide this by the policy in years to 
get the annual IROAN requirement.  Multiplying the annual IROAN requirement times 
the Repair Cycle Time in years yields the equivalent loss of LAV-25s. Figure 15 
represents the results.  
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Equivalent Ao  
LAV-25s 
4 91.68% $21,375,000 165 147 
5 91.16% $17,100,000 164 149 
6 90.38% $14,250,000 163 150 
7 89.85% $12,214,286 162 151 
8 88.42% $10,687,500 159 150 
Table 3. Table of Expected Operationally Available LAV-25s with IROAN 
Discount 
 
Some equations with a sample calculation will help to clarify the table and graph.  
Table 4 below shows how the expected readiness rating was calculated.  Note that this 
assumes the given rotation policy is being followed every year.  There are 180 LAV-25s 
authorized to be held by active duty operating forces.  Using the expected readiness for 
the Six Year Rotation Policy we can calculate the expected number of LAV-25s that 
would be operationally available. sLAVsLAV 25163%38.90*25180 −=−  
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Avg Readiness for 
Age E(contribution) 
1 0.17 96.04% 0.16006845 
2 0.17 92.77% 0.154616498 
3 0.17 90.98% 0.151629814 
4 0.17 86.91% 0.144858331 
5 0.17 89.09% 0.148491152 
6 0.17 86.50% 0.144171258 
7 0 86.63% 0 
8 0 78.42% 0 
  0.903835504 
  
Expected Operating readiness 
from policy   
Table 4.  Example of Expected Operating Readiness from Policy calculation 
 
The opportunity cost is the cost of the IROAN rotation policy in terms of vehicles 
not available for operations.  Under the Six Year Rotation Policy, 30 LAV-25s per year 
would be sent to IROAN (180 divided by 6 years).  This study has used a RCT of 150 
days or 0.41 years for this study.  
sLAVyrsyrsLAV 253.1241.0*/2530 −=−   
On average, 12.3 LAV-25s will be at the depot when using the Six Year Rotation 
Policy. This opportunity cost is a further reduction in the number of LAV-25s available 
for employment on any given day, so we subtract this from the 163 vehicles that we 
expected to be available, giving an equivalent of 150 LAV-25s available for employment. 
The implication is that a 7 year IROAN rotation policy is the most effective in 
maximizing the number of LAV-25s available for employment.  This statement must be 
interpreted within the constraints of the data.  The “Hangar Queen” effect is still present 
and it depresses the effectiveness of IROAN.  So keeping in mind that this data represents 
the lower bound we modify this statement to say that the best IROAN policy is no more 
than 7 years, but could be more frequent. The expected benefits of implementing a seven 
year IROAN policy over the current six year policy is one additional LAV-25 
operationally available and cost savings of $1.9 million (FY06) on average.  The cost 
savings are generated through an average four vehicle reduction in demand of four 
vehicles with a unit cost of $475,000 per unit.  
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 This research project purposely focused on measuring the economics effects of 
the IROAN program.  Research into the efficiency of Depot Maintenance has been 
conducted in the past (Mullins 2005, Wilson 2001). Further study is warranted given the 
likelihood of non-value added activities in a process that is 150 days long. A sensitivity 
analysis serves to highlight the point. From Table 3, we see that under the 6-year policy 
we have 150 equivalent LAV-25s operationally available given a 150 day RCT for 
IROAN. A ten percent reduction is IROAN cycle time would reduce the opportunity cost 
of the program by two vehicles.  That means two additional LAV-25s operationally 
available per day for the operating forces.  In other words, reducing RCT 15 days is 
equivalent to improving the average readiness of the fleet by 1%. The SOAR program 
seeks to address this issue through a careful selection of activities for the depot to 
perform, but there are additional gains that can be made through the reduction of queues. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
The IROAN program generally has the anticipated positive effect on fleet 
readiness.  As IROAN age increased, readiness decreased at around 2% per year.  That is 
roughly an additional 7 days of dead-line for each LAV-25. This data helps put the 
IROAN program value in perspective, but does not answer the question of what is the 
value of IROAN.  As previously stated, this research project will not value outcomes of 
the alternatives.  The goal is to provide useful analysis to inform the Program Manager 
about potential outcomes from different policy choices.  There are some other 
conclusions that can be drawn. 
The actual rotation rate of the LAV-25 fleet is different than the stated policy. 
Overall, the LAV-25 fleet is being managed on an eight year cycle. The active duty 
operating forces are being rotated through IROAN very close to the stated policy of six 
years. This is expected and justified given the usage and importance of the active duty 
forces relative to other reporting units. Additionally, research indicates that a seven year 
rotation policy for active duty operating forces LAV-25s is better than the current policy 
if opportunity costs are considered. The expected marginal benefits of the seven year 
policy are a cost savings of $1.9 million FY06, and one additional LAV-25 operationally 
available.  
The Frey model is useful for analyzing the effectiveness of any MARES 
reportable equipment in the inventory that has a regularly scheduled Depot Maintenance 
program. The data necessary to use this model for analyzing some other item in the 
Marine Corps inventory is obtainable with a modest amount of effort.  The Readiness and 
Analysis Department within Marine Corps Logistics Command would be a reasonable 
place to start, as they have ready access to the necessary databases.  Researchers seeking 
access to the database used by the author can contact the author, the lead advisor to this 
research project, the Maintenance Officer assigned to PM LAV, or the Readiness and 
Analysis Department at LOGCOM. 
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The information systems that store maintenance and supply data are either 
inadequate for focused studies, or difficult to use.  The VAMOSC system stores a vast 
amount of information in a readily usable online database.  But the data was not specific 
enough to be useful in this study.  The MERIT database managed by LOGCOM had 
specific data, but it was not in a very usable form.  To be fair, these databases are vast 
improvements over previous methods.  But there are possible improvements to be made 
in the quantity and quality of data. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The stated policy is to take three variables into account; mileage, operating hours, 
and time.  This study was only able to analyze one of the three variables.  It would be 
beneficial to develop a multivariate statistical model to give a clearer picture of which of 
these variables has the greatest effect of readiness. At the time of writing, data of this 
quality would require enormous effort to collect because of the disjointedness of the 
Logistics Automated Information Systems of the Marine Corps. A serious effort has been 
put into replacing these legacy systems for many years.  Hopefully the future system will 
store comprehensive maintenance and cost data with more specificity and in a more 
usable form. 
  This study could be part of a comprehensive analysis of the LAV Fleet’s 
maintenance system.  Further research is warranted into the relationship between 
readiness and parts availability, organizational and intermediate maintenance labor 
quantity and quality, and supply systems. This would provide a more complete picture of 
the system, and what results could be expected by changing each variable.  Additional 
research into the readiness characteristics of other LAV variants would also be beneficial.  
As stated in the Chapter II, the operating conditions of each variant are different, placing 
different demands on the subsystems on the vehicle.  It is reasonable to assume that the 
readiness profile of these variants might be quite different from the LAV-25. These 
efforts would give the Program Manager, and Marine Corps leaders, a better perspective 
on how to effectively manage available resources. 
 In the absence of a more comprehensive automated system, a detailed study of a 
set of an LAV sample over a finite period of time would also be a valuable undertaking. 
 31
Stewart Nickless (1998) conducted research into the operating cost drivers for the LAV 
fleet by focusing on I MEF.  A similar effort, perhaps even more focused, could provide 
useful insight into what is the best IROAN policy. 
 This study was limited in scope to the IROAN program over a finite period with 
no major variations in fleet employment. The future of the LAV community will likely be 
quite different than the period considered. The current operational tempo is far greater 
than the period studied. The entire fleet of LAVs will be undergoing a major upgrade 
over the next three years. The SOAR Program is replacing the IROAN Program in the 
near future.  
The IROAN program has been ongoing since 1994, and this is first documented 
attempt at assessing the program’s contribution to Operational Availability. The potential 
benefits that this study uncovered could have been realized, had they been identified 
sooner. The major point is that analysis of the readiness benefits that any program creates 
is necessary when there may be more productive uses for those resources.   
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APPENDIX:   LIFE OF AN LAV-25 
 This appendix is a chronology of the life of one specific LAV-25, serial number 
521611.  There are two purposes for this appendix.  One is to give the reader an idea of 
what the operating cycle is like for a vehicle.  The other purpose is to give an indication 
of how many different sources are required to piece this history together.  This particular 
vehicle was the author’s while he was the company commander for Company B, Second 
Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion from June 2003 until July 2004. 
 Maintenance history for LAVs can be accesses through MERIT.  The data goes 
back to 1996.  There are entries that date back to 1994, but they are not associated with 
particular reporting units.  Theoretically, every corrective maintenance action and every 
scheduled second echelon Preventative Maintenance Check and Service is recorded in the 
system.  The Equipment Repair Order (ERO) is comparable to a job order number, and it 
is recorded in the database as well.  We can reconstruct the history of a vehicle by 
reviewing this record of transactions.   
For example, the system does not record when a vehicle has gone to IROAN, 
since that program is separate from the normal maintenance process.  But, since the 
database records the owning unit, we can scan the history for when there is a change in 
reporting units.  This would likely indicate that an IROAN has occurred.  If there were a 
long break between reported deficiencies this would tend to confirm our hypothesis, since 
the IROAN program is not brief.  
A review of the maintenance history of 521611 reveals that from 1996 to 1999 the 
vehicle belonged to I MEF.  The last ERO submitted by I MEF for this vehicle was in 
February 1999.  The next entry was originated in II MEF in September 2000.  II MEF 
reports on the vehicle until June 2005.  I MEF reports the same discrepancy in July 2005 
that II MEF reported in June.  The author personally knows that the vehicle was switched 
during a unit rotation of deployed forces, which explains this phenomenon.   
 The depots keep the history of which vehicles have gone to IROAN when in their 
Serialized Tracking System (STS).  Maintenance Center Albany’s STS reports that 
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521611 entered IROAN in March 1999 and was issued to II MEF in August 2000, for a 
total of 17 months “in stores”.  This information meshes with the data that we pulled 
from our serial number query in MERIT. 
 The point is to illuminate the difficulties of tracking a vehicle’s history.  There is 
no single data source that currently provides information about the usage, maintenance, 
repair history, ownership, and depot rotation.  MIMMS tracks the repairs made on 
vehicles as well as the parts and time required to effect repairs.  The supply system, 
SASSY, records the cost of those repair parts.  The Serialized Tracking System records 
when vehicles are passed through the depot, but not the cost of the actual overhaul.  This 
is a shortfall that limits a program manager’s ability to make decisions. The maintenance 
history of vehicles by serial number has been recorded.  The quality of that information is 
questionable, it is not easy to compile, and it is difficult to analyze once compiled 
because of the format of the data.  Quality information that is easily accessible begets 
quality decisions, and with the information as it is currently arrayed, gathering quality 
information requires significant resources. The current information systems are certainly 
an improvement over the past, but there remains plenty of room for improvement.   














1 13 No Major Defect-SL-3 Application 4/11/2006 25 SHT PART   90 WXG83 
1 03 
Body, Frame, or Hull-Cracked, Broken, or 
Bent 4/7/2006 CL CLOSED   140 WXA42 
1 03 
Body, Frame, or Hull-Cracked, Broken, or 
Bent 4/7/2006 CL CLOSED   139 Q7025 
1 03 
Body, Frame, or Hull-Cracked, Broken, or 
Bent 3/10/2006 CL CLOSED 73 20 QUQ64 
1 06 Power Train-Cracked, Broken, or Bent 12/15/2005 CL CLOSED   40 WXA33 
1 06 Power Train-Housing and Castings 11/29/2005 CL CLOSED   120 WXA07 
1 06 Power Train-Cracked, Broken, or Bent 10/20/2005 CL CLOSED   5 Q7098 
1 06 Transmitter/Output Circuitry-Inoperative 10/20/2005 CL CLOSED   77 WXM22 
1 13 Body, Frame, or Hull-Replace 10/18/2005 CL CLOSED   90 WYC46 
1 13 No Major Defect-SL-3 Application 10/18/2005 CL CLOSED   113 WZC26 
1 06 Transmitter/Output Circuitry-Inoperative 10/4/2005 CL CLOSED   70 WYC52 
1 13 Body, Frame, or Hull-Replace 9/23/2005 CL CLOSED   144 WZC40 
1 06 Armament-Cracked, Broken, or Bent 8/22/2005 CL CLOSED   37 WYC32 
1 03 Turret System-Distribution Systems 8/19/2005 CL CLOSED   29 Q7046 
1 03 Turret System-Distribution Systems 8/19/2005 CL CLOSED   21 WXC22 
1 06 Armament-Cracked, Broken, or Bent 8/1/2005 CL CLOSED   7 WZC19 
1 06 Armament-Cracked, Broken, or Bent 7/28/2005 CL CLOSED   28 WYC16 
2 03 Body, Frame, or Hull-Housing and Castings 6/6/2005 CL CLOSED 6 6 QDA93 
2 06 Engine-Inoperative 1/20/2005 CL CLOSED 3 16 V3715 
2 02 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES                          11/3/2004 JC 
JOB 
COMPLETE 32 32 F93VF36 
2 02 LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES                          11/3/2004 JC 
JOB 
COMPLETE 34 34 F93VE82 
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